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Abstract
We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Ofﬁcers (CEOs) respond to incentives and
how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we
compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We ﬁnd that CEOs are consider-
ablymoretrustingandexhibitmoretrustworthinessthanstudents—thusreachingsubstantially
higher efﬁciency levels than students. Moreover, we ﬁnd that, for CEOs as well as for students,
incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backﬁre by inducing less trustworthy
behavior—giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, the availability of penalizing
incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining
fromimplementingthepunishmentthreat, theagentexhibitssigniﬁcantlymoretrustworthiness
than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust seems to reinforce trustworthy behav-
ior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it
is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use
the punishment threat, although CEOs use it signiﬁcantly less. (JEL: C91, C92, J30, J41)
1. Introduction
Trust and trustworthiness are ubiquitous in human life. Most economic trans-
actions require trust and trustworthiness because it is rarely the case that all
dimensions of a transaction can be contractually speciﬁed and enforced. Arrow
(1972, p. 357) neatly expressed this idea three decades ago: “Virtually every
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust.… It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained
by a lack of mutual conﬁdence.”
This paper examines experimentally how people provide and respond to
incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. Our data set is unique
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in that our subject pool is comprised of Chief Executive Ofﬁcers (CEOs) as well
as students. This provided us with the rare opportunity to examine trust and trust-
worthiness among CEOs under controlled conditions.1 Economic experiments Footnote 1
are often criticized because they are typically based on observing the behavior
of undergraduate students. This can be problematic because students’ behav-
ior may not be representative of behavior in naturally occurring environments,
where selection effects may have created distinct populations of economic deci-
sionmakers—e.g.,CEOsmaybecharacterizedbyparticularlyselﬁshpreferences.
This criticism may be quite relevant in the domain of trusting and trustworthy
behaviorbecausetrustworthinessoftenrequiresbehaviorthatisatoddswithone’s
own material self-interest. In this case we would expect to observe less trust and
trustworthiness among CEOs in situations where trustworthiness requires non-
selﬁshbehavior. However, insharpcontrasttothisconjecture, inourexperiments
CEOs exhibited much more trusting and trustworthy behavior than students and,
as a consequence, they achieved substantially higher efﬁciency levels in their
transactions.
Moreover, our results indicate that among CEOs, as well as among students,
there are hidden costs and hidden returns of incentives. These costs and returns
are hidden in the sense that they escape our attention if our reasoning is based
on the assumption that people are exclusively self-interested. We show that the
use of the explicit threat to sanction shirking backﬁres by inducing less trustwor-
thy behavior; accordingly, incentives that explicitly threaten to penalize shirking
may involve hidden costs. In recent years several economists have focused atten-
tion on similar phenomena (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Kreps 1997;
BenabouandTirole2002). However, ourresultsalsoindicatethattheavailability
of the sanctioning threat can be quite productive—giving rise to hidden returns
of incentives. If principals voluntarily refrain from using the punishment threat
when it is available, agents exhibit signiﬁcantly more trustworthiness than if the
punishment threat is not available. Thus, if agents face no punishment threat,
the mere fact that the principal could have used the punishment option affects
the agent’s trustworthiness in a positive manner. This ﬁnding suggests that the
deliberate nonuse of the threat is perceived as a particularly trusting act that is
reciprocated with a particularly trustworthy act. Exhibiting trust, to some degree,
seems to generate trustworthiness that rationalizes the initially exhibited trust. In
other words, trust and trustworthiness reinforce each other.
1. Experimentalists recently have made a concerted effort to examine the behavior of higher-level
decision makers. For example, Cooper, Kagel, Lo, and Gu (1999) examined the ratchet effect with
middle and upper level Chinese managers; Hannan, Kagel, and Moser (2002) studied gift exchange
among MBA students; Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2003, 2004) reported data from a CEO subsample
in a beauty contest game; and Haigh and List (2004) studied investment decisions made by traders
from the Chicago Board of Trade. The interested reader should see Ball and Cech (1996) for a
discussion of subject pool effects.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page3—# 3
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In view of this result one might expect that rational principals do in fact
refrain from using the punishment option. It turns out, however, that only 40%
of the CEOs and 20% of the students do not use the threat when it is available.
Since using the threat reduces principals’ earnings substantially, the frequent use
of the punishment threat constitutes a puzzle that warrants further investigation.
Our preferred interpretation of the hidden costs and returns of incentives
is in terms of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people respond to acts that
are perceived as kind in a kind manner and to acts that are perceived as hostile
in a hostile manner (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999; Falk and
Fischbacher1999).Itseemsplausiblethatexplicitthreatstosanctionshirkingmay
beperceivedashostileperseandconveyanelementofdistrust. Reciprocalagents
will respond to this hostility with increased shirking. Moreover, refraining from
the use of a saliently available explicit threat may be perceived as a particularly
kind and trusting act, which could explain why the deliberate nonuse of the
threat led to less shirking compared to the exogenous absence of the incentive.
Our interpretation implies that not all kinds of incentives involve hidden costs
or returns because not all of the incentives will be perceived as hostile. Yet,
our interpretation also means that the psychological message that is conveyed
by incentives—whether they are perceived as kind or as hostile—has important
behavioral effects.2 Footnote 2
Webelievethatourresultsarerelevantbeyondthecontextofourexperiments.
This is so because in our context social preferences such as altruism, fairness, or
reciprocityarelikelytobeamajorsourceoftrustingandtrustworthybehavior,and
thesemotiveshavebeenshowntoberelevantinmanyotherstrategicsituationsas
well(foroverviewssee, e.g., Camerer2002; Sobel2002). Therefore, totheextent
that our results arise from interactions between social preferences and economic
incentives, there is reason to believe that these interactions are also relevant in
other strategic games.
There is also ﬁeld evidence indicating that our results may be relevant in
the workplace. In his book on wage rigidity, Bewley (1999, p. 431) reports
that managers are well aware of the fact that workers have many opportunities
to take advantage of employers, which renders worker morale important. Good
morale means that workers are trustworthy, i.e., they also perform well in sit-
uations where they could shirk without being detected. To achieve and sustain
a trustworthy workforce, punishment “should seldom be used to obtain cooper-
ation.” Therefore, “good management practice uses punishment and dismissal
2. EvidenceinFehrandGächter(2002)supportsthisview.Theyshowthatthepositiveandnegative
framing of an incentive has a strong impact on effort in situations requiring trustworthiness. If the
incentive is framed as a pay cut in case of shirking, agents’ effort is much lower compared to an
economically identical incentive that is framed as a bonus that is paid in addition to a (lower) base
wage when the required performance threshold is met.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page4—# 4
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largely to deter and weed out bad characters and incompetents and to protect the
company from malefactors.”
The same forces that explain our data patterns may also explain why so
few marriages are accompanied by prenuptial agreements. It seems plausible that
prenuptialagreementsarelikelytointroducedistrustintoamarriagebecausethey
require detailed discussions and speciﬁcations of what will happen in the case
of a divorce. As a consequence they may do more harm than good. Moreover, it
also seems likely that being trusted is, in itself, valuable for the trustee. Including
contingencies about what will happen if one party fails to abide by the contract
is likely to be taken as an indication of distrust and perhaps even hostility, which
in turn may trigger what the prenuptial agreement attempted to avoid—a lack of
mutual trust and cooperation.3 If it is true that explicit haggling and bargaining Footnote 3
about the concrete terms of a marriage sows the seeds for malfunctioning, then
the existence of marriage and divorce laws can be interpreted as a remedy for a
market failure because these laws free the parties from the necessity to bargain
ex ante about the terms of their marriage.
In view of the potential relevance of our results for a wide variety of con-
texts, we believe that by taking into account the effects we have documented, the
economic theory of contracts and incentives will progress further. This theory
has progressed substantially during the last two decades, but there are still crucial
gaps in our knowledge about the effects of contracts and incentives (for excel-
lent reviews of the empirical evidence, see Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori and
Salanie (2003).
Recently, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) and Bohnet, Frey, and
Huck (2001) reported interesting evidence indicating counterproductive effects




examines how CEOs use and respond to incentives under controlled conditions,
and whether CEOs exhibit more or less trust and trustworthiness than the typical
experimental subject pool—undergraduate students. Moreover, the mentioned
authors do not study the relational aspect of incentives, that is, the impact of the
incentive that arises from the fact that the principal can threaten to punish or can
forgo threatening to punish the agent when given the opportunity.4 In contrast, Footnote 4
3. Business relations also may not be immune to such effects. In a classic paper, Macaulay (1963)
reportsthat“detailednegotiatedcontractscangetinthewayofcreatinggoodexchangerelationships
between business units.” Likewise, Sitkin and Roth (1993, p. 376) assert that “legalistic remedies
can erode the interpersonal foundations of a relationship they are intended to bolster because they
replace reliance on an individual’s good will with objective, formal requirements.”
4. In Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) the principal chooses whether to enter a contract or not to
enteracontract. Thentheagenthasthechoicetohonorthecontractornottohonorthecontract—the“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page5—# 5
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our study focuses on this aspect by implementing experimental treatments that
vary the principal’s capability of imposing a punishment.5
Footnote 5
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In Section 1 we describe
our experimental design, our subject pool, and the details of the experimen-
tal parameters and procedures. In Section 2 we report our results. Section 3
summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Experimental Design and Procedures
To study the hidden costs and returns of incentives in situations requiring trust
and trustworthiness we used two versions of a Trust game.6 In both versions Footnote 6
a principal (Actor 1) and an agent (Actor 2) were paired anonymously and the
identity of the transaction partner was never revealed to the subjects.7 Both the Footnote 7
principal and the agent received an endowment of ten experimental money units
called “shanks.” At the end of the experiment the amount of shanks earned was
exchanged into real money (U.S.$) according to a publicly known exchange rate
(thisrepresentedtheirpayoffastherewasnoshow-upfee). IntheTrust treatment,
the principal could transfer x ∈{ 0,1,2,...,10} shanks to the agent. For every
shank transferred, the agent received three shanks. In addition, the principal had
toannouncea“desiredback-transfer” ˆ y ∈{ 0,1,2,...,3x}fromtheagent.When
theprincipalhadmadehisdecision(x, ˆ y),theagentwasinformedaboutthistwo-
tuple and then chose the actual level of the back-transfer y ∈{ 0,1,2,...,3x}.
The principal’s payoff in the Trust treatment was given by Πp = 10 − x + y,
whereas the agent’s payoff was deﬁned as Πa = 10 + 3x − y. Thus, the desired
back-transfer ˆ y was not payoff-relevant.
experimenterexogenouslydeterminesthepunishmenttechnology. InGneezyandRustichini(2000a,
2000b) the agents also face incentives that are determined by the experimenters.
5. Our study also differs substantially from the experiments conducted by social psychologists on
theunderminingofintrinsicmotivationbyextrinsicrewards. ThisliteraturestartedwithDeci(1971),
and has led to several metastudies (see, e.g., Cameron and Pierce 1994; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan
1999). Trust and trustworthiness plays no role in these experiments, whereas it is key in our context.
Moreover, inthesepsychologyexperimentssubjectsalwaysfacedexogenousincentives(intheform
of monetary rewards) set by the experimenter.
6. Thereisnowalargeliteratureonso-calledTrustandGiftExchangegamesstartingwithCamerer
andWeigelt(1988),Fehr,Kirchsteiger,andRiedl(1993),andBerg,Dickhaut,andMcCabe(1995)—
see Camerer (2002) and Sobel (2002) for reviews. In general, these games are sequential social
dilemma games in which trusting or trustworthy behavior enhances the total payoff of the parties
involved, but in which individuals face monetary incentives inhibiting trust and trustworthiness. Our
general design is similar to Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), who study the behavior of students in a
Mensa experiment.
7. Our experimental procedures implemented a single-blind design that ensures that subjects do
not know each other’s identities and that the decisions made by a pair of actors are known only to
the pair and the experimenter. At the end of the experiment, subjects are privately paid what they
earned during the experiment.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page6—# 6
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In the other treatment, however, which we denote as the Trust with Pun-
ishment (TWP) treatment, the desired back-transfer was important. In TWP,
the principal also had to make a decision about x ∈{ 0,1,2,... ,10} and
ˆ y ∈{ 0,1,2,... ,3x}. In addition to (x, ˆ y), he decided whether to impose a
ﬁxed ﬁne of f = 4 that had to be paid by the agent if y<ˆ y. Thus, in TWP the
principalcouldthreatentopunishtheagentincaseofmalfeasance. Intheinstruc-
tionsweavoidedvalue-ladenterms; thatis, wedidnotusetheword“punishment”
or “ﬁne.” Instead, we spoke of a “conditional payoff cut.”8 After the principal Footnote 8
had made his decision, which was constrained to be either (x, ˆ y,f = 0) or
(x, ˆ y,f = 4), the agent was informed about the decision and had to choose y.
The principal’s payoff in TWP was given by Πp = 10 − x + y irrespective of
whether the agent was ﬁned or not. The ﬁne was not given to the principal. The
agent’spayoffwasgivenbyΠa =10+3x –y –4iftheprincipalimposedtheﬁne
and the agent chose y<ˆ y. If the principal did not impose the ﬁne or if the agent
chose y ≥ˆ y, the agent did not have to pay a ﬁne; he earned Πa = 10 + 3x − y.
If both the principal and agent are selﬁsh, and if the principal anticipates the
agent’s selﬁshness, the predictions for our two treatments are straightforward. In
the Trust treatment the selﬁsh agent chooses y = 0 irrespective of the transfer
x. Hence, a rational and selﬁsh principal chooses x = 0. There is no precise
predictionaboutthedesiredback-transfer ˆ y because ˆ y doesnotaffectthepayoffs.
In the TWP treatment there are subgame perfect equilibria in which the principal
can induce a selﬁsh agent to pay back y = 3o ry = 4 by imposing a ﬁne.
For instance, if the principal transfers x = 1, demands ˆ y = 3 and imposes
f = 4, the agent’s best response is y = 3. In this case the principal earns
Πp = 10 − 1 + 3 = 12 whereas the agent earns Πa = 10 + 3 − 3 = 10.
Likewise, if the principal transfers x = 2, demands ˆ y = 4, and imposes f = 4,
y = 4 is a best response. The principal then earns Πp = 10 − 2 + 4 = 12
and the agent also earns Πa = 10 + 6 − 4 = 12. It is obvious that in TWP
the principal can never enforce more than y = 4 by imposing the ﬁne. Yet, by
choosing f = 4 his enforcement power exceeds the case of f = 0. Thus, in
TWP the principal will always use the ﬁne, and this should yield a higher payoff
than under the Trust treatment, and compared to f = 0 in the TWP treatment. In
addition, if the principal chooses f = 0 in the TWP treatment, the agent should
respondinthesamemannerasintheTrusttreatmentwhereﬁneswereexcludedby
design.
The only difference between the Trust and the TWP condition is the avail-
ability of the ﬁne. The back-transfers of the agents in the Trust treatment provide
uswithabaselinemeasureoftrustworthiness. Positiveback-transfersintheTrust
treatment may be due to the agents’ preferences for inequity aversion, reciprocity
8. Appendices A, B, C, and D contain copies of the instructions.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page7—# 7
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or altruism.9 By comparing these back-transfers with the back-transfers in TWP, Footnote 9
we can study the effect of the availability and the actual use of the incentive
on back-transfers. Likewise, by comparing principals’ transfers across Trust and
TWP conditions, we can examine the effect of incentive use and incentive avail-
ability on the trusting behavior of the principals. The comparison between the
Trust condition and those interactions in the TWP condition in which the prin-
cipal chooses f = 0 is particularly interesting because in economic terms the
situation faced by the agents is identical in these cases. However, from a psy-
chological viewpoint it may make a difference whether the absence of a threat is
exogenously determined or endogenously chosen by the principals because the
deliberatenonuseofasalientlyavailablethreatmaybeperceivedbytheagentsas
a particularly trusting act. Thus, by comparing back-transfers in the trust condi-
tionwithback-transfersintheTWPinteractionswithf =0, wecanstudywhether
trust breeds trustworthiness.
Since one important purpose of our project was to compare the principals’
use of the incentive and the agents’ response to the incentive across CEOs and
students, both subject pools participated in the Trust and the TWP treatment. In
the student treatments, one shank was worth $0.20, and in the CEO treatments
one shank was worth $2.00. The different exchange rates served the purpose to
controlforstakeeffectsacrosssubjectpools.WehypothesizedthatbecauseCEOs
have a higher income than students they need to face higher stake levels to take
the experiment seriously. Postexperiment interviews revealed that both students
and CEOs took the experiment very seriously.10 Footnote 10
We recruited 126 subjects for our student treatments from the undergraduate
student body at the University of Costa Rica. Each treatment was run in a large
classroomonthecampusoftheUniversityofCostaRica. Toensurethatdecisions
remained anonymous the subjects were seated far apart from each other. The
CEO subject pool included 76 CEOs from the coffee beneﬁcio (coffee mill)
sector who were gathered at The Costa Rica Coffee Institute’s (ICAFE) annual
conference in March 2001.11 The conference is funded by ICAFE and presents Footnote 11
9. There are now many papers that model these kinds of social preferences. On reciprocity see,
e.g., Rabin(1993)orFalkandFischbacher(1999), oninequityaversionseeFehrandSchmidt(1999)
or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and on altruism see Andreoni and Miller (2002).
10. In an experimental session, CEOs earned on average $65; students’ average earnings were
approximately $5.65. A session lasted roughly 45–60 minutes. To put these earnings ﬁgures into
perspective, note that our students could have earned about $2 per hour in a good alternative job,
and a large cup of coffee costs about $0.25 on campus.
11. ICAFE was created in 1948, and is a semi-autonomous institution in charge of providing
technical assistance, undertaking ﬁeld research, supervising receipts and processing of coffee, and
recording export contracts. Note that some of the data were gathered after the conference because
of extenuating circumstances (there was a march/rally the day of the conference and several CEOs
left the conference early or did not show up). Data gathered in this manner are not signiﬁcantly
different from data gathered at the conference, so we pool the data. Also, it is important to stress
that we did not collect complete demographic data on CEOs. Nevertheless, it is clear that the CEOs“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page8—# 8
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the CEOs with information related to the most recent technological advances in
the coffee processing sector, regulations within Costa Rica as well as abroad,
and general market conditions, among other agenda items. Each of the CEO
treatments was run in a large room on-site at the institute. As in the case of the
students, communicationbetweenthesubjectswasprohibitedandtheCEOswere
seated such that no subject could observe another individual’s decision.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects signed a consent form in which
they acknowledged their voluntary participation in the experiment and agreed
to abide by the rules of the experiment. There were two types of sessions. In a
Trust–TWP session, subjects had to participate ﬁrst in the Trust treatment and
then in the TWP treatment. To control for possible spillover effects across treat-
ments within a session, we reversed the treatment ordering in the TWP–Trust
sessions.12 Each subject participated in only one type of session, and within Footnote 12
a session each subject had the same role in the Trust and the TWP treatment.







on the decision sheet. Once all agents had made their decision the experimenters
again collected all decision sheets and informed the principals about the decision
of their agent. Second, the experimental instructions were ﬁrst written in English
andthentranslatedintoSpanish. ThistranslationwasperformedbyaCostaRican
expert. To control for translation biases, a different translator located in Arizona
then translated the Spanish instructions back into English (see the Journal’s web
site for the Spanish instructions).
3. Experimental Results
This section presents our experimental results. Since we ﬁnd that ordering effects
are not important we pool the data in the following empirical analyses.13 Our Footnote 13
ﬁrst result relates to the comparison between the behavior of CEOs and students.
were overwhelmingly more male, older, wealthier, etc. If our goal is to establish a CEO-student
difference, it is necessary to create a parallel sample of non-CEOs matched for comparability. This
is beyond the scope of our study, as we are mainly interested in testing for behavioral differences
across two very different groups.
12. During the ﬁrst treatment the subjects did not know that there would be a second treatment in
the session. After the ﬁrst treatment was completed, subjects were informed that another experiment
would take place. They were also informed that the second experiment was the ﬁnal one, and that
they would be matched with a new partner in this experiment.
13. Inaddition,weexplicitlycontrolfororderingeffectsinourregressionsbelow(seefootnote17).“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page9—# 9
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A major criticism levied against experimental results concerns the fact that most
economic experiments are conducted with students. This may be problematic
for two reasons. First, students may not be a representative subject pool for the
overallpopulation. Second, duetoselectioneffects, particularpeople, whodonot
behave like students, may be overrepresented in certain sectors of the economy.
Both reasons may constitute obstacles for generalizing the results gained from
student experiments to other environments. Our ﬁrst result addresses this issue.
Result 1. CEO principals transfer more money than students. Moreover, for
any given transfer level, CEO agents pay back more money than students.
Result 1 can be taken as an indication that CEOs are more trusting and
exhibit more trustworthiness than students. They display a higher degree of trust-
ing behavior because they make themselves more vulnerable to exploitation by
transferring more money, and they exhibit more trustworthiness because, for
identical transfer levels, they send back more money than students. Support for
Result 1 can be found in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2 (all numbers in tables Tables 1, 2
Figures 1, 2
and ﬁgures are in shanks). Table 1 presents the average behavior of students and
CEOsinbothtreatmenttypes. InTable1, boldfacednumbersindicatetheaverage
results for the CEOs, whereas the student results are in plain font. The ﬁrst line
in Table 1 shows that, both in the Trust as well as in the TWP condition, CEOs
transfer, on average, more money to the agents than do students. This difference
in transfers (investments) is signiﬁcant at the p<0.05 level in both treatments
Table 1. Comparison of trust and trust with punishment treatment
Average (over all observations)
Trust with
Trust punishment
Transfer (investment) 4.0 (2.6) 5.0 (2.9)
x to the agent 5.9 (2.3) 7.3 (2.3)
Desired payback in 76.9 (41.0) 69.9 (24.0)
percent of tripled 65.1 (20.5) 66.1 (23.2)
investment ˆ y/3x
Actual payback in 31.6 (26.3) 38.7 (33.6)
percent of tripled 44.1 (22.3) 44.0 (23.3)
investment y/3x
Principals’ payoff 10.5 (3.0) 11.0 (4.9)
11.8 (3.7) 12.6 (4.9)
Agents’ payoff 17.5 (5.9) 17.4 (7.5)
20.1 (5.6) 20.5 (5.1)
Number of 126 (63 pairs) 126 (63 pairs)
observations (pairs) 76 (38 pairs) 76 (38 pairs)
Notes: CEO data in bold. Standard deviations in parentheses. Figures are in shanks.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 10 — #10
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Table 2. Regression estimates for the agents’ payback
Model type
Students CEOs
Variable OLS Tobit Tobit RE OLS Tobit Tobit RE
Investment 0.79∗∗ 1.13∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 1.2∗∗ 1.2∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(5.7) (5.8) (5.5) (5.7) (5.8) (3.7)
TWP −0.27 −0.45 −0.26 −1.8∗ −1.8∗ −1.5∗
(0.36) (0.44) (0.33) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
TWPN 4.6∗∗ 4.7∗∗ 3.6∗∗ 6.1∗∗ 6.2∗∗ 6.3∗∗
(3.5) (2.8) (2.4) (4.7) (4.8) (4.7)
Constant 1.5∗ −1.1 −0.84 1.1 1.1 2.3
(1.7) (0.87) (0.71) (0.78) (0.80) (1.2)
Person random
effects NO NO YES NO NO YES
R2 0.37 — — 0.55 — —
n 126 126 126 76 76 76
Notes: Dependent variable is the agent’s transfer back to the principal (in shanks). t-ratios (in absolute value) are
beneath coefﬁcient estimates. Tobit RE parameter estimates are marginal effects computed at the sample means.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
according to a two-sided Mann–Whitney test (z = 3.76 in the Trust and z = 3.67
in the TWP condition).14 Footnote 14
The second line in Table 1 shows that in both conditions the CEOs’ desired
back-transferisroughly66%ofthetripledinvestment.Thismeansthatonaverage
CEO-principals proposed to divide the total amount of money that was made
available through their transfers such that the payoff to the principal and the
agent became equal. Table 1 also shows that the students’ desired back-transfer
is slightly higher in both treatments. This difference is, however, not signiﬁcant
at conventional signiﬁcance levels according to a Mann–Whitney test. The third
line in Table 1 indicates that in both conditions the agents’ payback, measured as
apercentageofthetripledinvestment, ishigherforCEOs. Notethatbymeasuring
thepaybackasapercentageofthetripledinvestmentweareexplicitlycontrolling
for the investment level. While the CEOs pay back roughly 44% of the tripled
investment in both conditions, the students’ payback varies between 32% and
39%.15 Further support for differences in trustworthiness can be gained from Footnote 15
Figures 1 and 2 (Figures 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b complement Figures 1 and 2 by
plotting the raw data from the treatments). The ﬁgures compare the payback of
the students with the payback of the CEOs at various investment levels. Figure 1,
14. All test results reported in the paper use two-sided alternatives.
15. In cases where principals transferred zero shanks but requested a positive return, we set the
desired payback in percent of tripled investment equal to 1. In these cases where the agent sent back
zero shanks, we set the actual payback in percent of tripled investment equal to 0.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 11 — #11
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Figure 1. Back-transfers of CEOs and students in the trust treatment.
whichisbasedondatagatheredintheTrustcondition, showsthatCEOspayback
considerably more than students at each investment interval.16 Figure 2, which Footnote 16
is based on data from the TWP condition, also indicates that CEOs are more
trustworthy at every given investment interval.
To explore these differences further, we estimate OLS, Tobit, and Tobit ran-
dom effects regression models for the students and the CEOs. The dependent
variable in the regressions is the payback of the agent, which is regressed on the
principals’ transfer to the agents and two dichotomous regressors. Formally, our
regression models are given by
yit = β1 + β2xit + β3 ∗ TWP + β4 ∗ TWP ∗ TWPN + ωit (1)
In equation (1), yit represents agent i’s payback to the principal in period t,
and xit denotes the principal’s transfer (investment) to agent i in period t.17 The Footnote 17
dummyvariableTWPequals1ifthesubjectisintheTWPcondition,0otherwise.
The dichotomous variable TWPN takes on the value of 1 if the subject is in the
TWP condition and does not use the punishment option, 0 otherwise. Thus,
the coefﬁcient β4 on the interaction term TWP∗TWPN measures the marginal
effect of not using the punishment option when the option is available, while
the coefﬁcient β3 measures the effect, relative to the Trust condition, of being in
treatment TWP and using the punishment option. Since there are typically quite
substantial individual differences in data sets where social preferences play a
role, and since our sequential design may have created dependencies between the
16. We partitioned the data into intervals because at some investment levels there are only a few
observations (see Figures 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b).
17. We also include a time dummy variable in ωit that captures ordering effects. They are never
signiﬁcant so we suppress further discussion.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 12 — #12
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p
Figure 1a. CEO raw data summary: Trust treatment.
p
Figure 1b. Student raw data summary: Trust treatment.
Trust and the TWP condition, the Tobit random effects model is the appropriate
speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, for completeness, and to give an indication of the
robustness of our results, we also report empirical results from OLS and Tobit
regression models.
Table 2 contains summary regression estimates. In each regression model,
empirical estimates from both the student and CEO samples indicate that the
coefﬁcient on investment is positive and signiﬁcant at the p<0.05 level. While“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 13 — #13
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Figure 2. Back-transfers of CEOs and students in the trust with punishment treatment.
intheOLSmodelthecoefﬁcientintheCEOs’speciﬁcationisconsiderablylarger,
the null hypothesis that the investment coefﬁcient for the CEOs is identical to the
coefﬁcient for the students in the Tobit random effects model cannot be rejected
at conventional levels. This result suggests that on the margin CEOs and students
behave similarly (i.e., the effect of a one-unit increase in xit measured at the
sampling means is isomorphic across samples).18 Footnote 18
If subjects care only for their own material payoff, then the punishment
option is a useful tool for principals to induce agents to transfer back some
money. Thus, if the punishment option is available, the principal will always
be better off in money terms if the option is used. Our next result shows, how-
ever, that in the presence of social preferences this argument may be seriously
misleading.
Result 2. If the punishment option is available, then agents pay back more
money and principals earn more money if the option is not used.
Result2suggeststhattheuseofthepunishmentoptiongeneratescoststhatare
overlooked if social preferences are neglected. Instead of increasing the amount
transferred back, the punishment actually reduces the payback. A ﬁrst indication




data, however, higher-order terms were statistically signiﬁcant to a cubic. In these speciﬁcations, on
the margin students returned less money than CEOs returned for xit values greater than ﬁve (three)
in the quadratic (cubic) model.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 14 — #14
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p
Figure 2a. CEO raw data summary: Trust with punishment treatment.
p
Figure 2b. Students raw data summary: Trust with punishment treatment.
numbers in the third line of Table 3 indicate that refraining from the use of the
punishmentoptionnearlydoublesthepaybackoftheCEOsasapercentageofthe
tripled investment. If the punishment option is used, then CEOs pay back 32.7%
of the tripled investment, while if the option is not used they pay back 61.4%.
For students, the increase in the payback is smaller but remains quite substantial.
In addition, Figures 3 and 4 show that, for any given investment interval, both Figures 3, 4
CEOs and students pay back much more money if the punishment option is not
utilized. Toexaminewhetherthisincreasedpaybackalsoledtoincreasedpayoffs“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 15 — #15
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Table 3. Splitting up the trust with punishment treatment
Average (over all observations)
Trust with punishment
Trust No punishment Punishment
Transfer (investment) 4.0 (2.6) 7.4 (1.7) 4.4 (2.8)
x to the agent 5.9 (2.3) 8.5 (2.1) 6.5 (2.1)
Desired payback in 76.9 (41.0) 60.4 (22.3) 72.5 (24.0)
percent of tripled 65.1 (20.5) 66.8 (19.3) 65.6 (26.0)
investment (ˆ y/3x)
Actual payback in 31.6 (26.3) 52.9 (22.1) 34.9 (35.2)
percent of tripled 44.1 (22.3) 61.4 (15.6) 32.7 (20.5)
investment (y/3x)
Principals’ payoff 10.5 (3.0) 14.1 (5.0) 10.2 (4.7)
11.8 (3.7) 16.5 (2.7) 10.0 (4.3)
Agents’ payoff 17.5 (5.9) 20.8 (6.2) 16.5 (7.6)
20.1 (5.6) 20.4 (4.9) 20.6 (5.2)
Number of 126 (63 pairs) 26 (13 pairs) 100 (50 pairs)
observations (pairs) 76 (38 pairs) 30 (15 pairs) 46 (23 pairs)
Notes: CEO data in bold. Standard deviations in parentheses. Figures are in shanks.
for the principals, we turn to the fourth line of Table 3, which reveals that both
for CEO principals and for student principals the material payoff is higher if the
punishment option is not used.
Figure 3. The impact of the punishment threat on CEOs’ back-transfers.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 16 — #16
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Figure 4. The impact of the punishment threat on students’ back-transfers.
To examine whether the increase in the payback that is associated with the
nonuse of the punishment option is signiﬁcant, we performed several statistical
tests. A Mann–Whitney test indicates that the null hypothesis of equivalent pay-
backs (in percent of tripled investments) can be rejected at the p<0.05 level
for CEOs and the p<0.10 level for students. Similarly, Mann–Whitney tests
of the null hypotheses that the principals’ payoffs are not affected by the use
of the punishment option can be rejected at the p<0.05 level for both CEO
and student samples. Furthermore, the regression coefﬁcient of TWPN in Table
2 measures the increase in investment that is associated with the nonuse of the
punishment option. For the CEO data, regression estimates in Table 2 indicate
that not using the punishment option increases the payback signiﬁcantly—
approximately by six units. In the student sample the increase is roughly four
units. Bothoftheseempiricalestimatesaresigniﬁcantlydifferentfromzeroatthe
p<0.05 level.
Result 2 informs us about the hidden costs of incentives. These costs are
hiddeninthesensethattheyhavegenerallybeenoverlookedbystandardcontract
theory because they are absent from models that are based on the self-interest
assumption. Next we examine whether there exist hidden returns of incentives—
returns that accrue from the availability of the incentive. We have already found
that refraining from punishment, when the option is available, is associated with
higher paybacks. This raises the question of whether the deliberate nonuse of the
punishment option is better than the nonavailability of the punishment option. If
it were true that one could increase one’s payback by deliberately not using the“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 17 — #17
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punishment option, we could speak of the hidden returns of incentives because
these returns can accrue only if the incentive is available. As before, these returns
are hidden in the sense that standard contract theory has neglected such effects.
Our next result characterizes these hidden returns to incentives.
Result 3. If in the TWP condition the available punishment option is not used,
then the agents pay back more money, and the principals earn more money, than
in the Trust condition where no punishment option is available.
Support for Result 3 comes ﬁrst from line 3 of Table 3, which suggests that
both the students as well as the CEOs pay back more money if the punishment
option is deliberately not used than when it is unavailable. For instance, for the
CEOs (students) the actual payback is 44.1% (31.6%) of the tripled investment
in the Trust treatment, whereas in the TWP treatment the CEO agents (student
agents)payback61.4%(52.9%)ifthereisnopunishmentthreat. Weﬁndthat, via
aWilcoxonsigned-rankstestformatchedpairs,thisdifferenceissigniﬁcantatthe
p<0.05 (p<0.10) level for CEOs (students). Similar insights follow from
inspection of Figures 3 and 4: not using the punishment option increases the
agents’ payback at every investment interval relative to not having the option
available. Moreover, Table 3 also indicates that CEO principals and student prin-
cipalsearnmoremoneywhentheydeliberatelydonotusethepunishmentoption,
adifferencethatissigniﬁcantatthep<0.05levelforCEOs, butonlymarginally
signiﬁcant in the student sample (p<0.15).
To examine whether these differences are statistically signiﬁcant in our
regression framework, we turn to the empirical results in Table 2. Note that
the effect of the deliberate nonuse of the punishment option, relative to the Trust
condition, can be measured via the summation of coefﬁcients β3 and β4 in our
regressionmodel. Thisfollowsbecauseβ3+β4 ∗TWPN = β3+β4 ifthesubject
is in the TWP condition and the principal did not use the punishment option (i.e.,
TWPN = 1). Table 2 reveals that for each regression model (except students
Tobit RE) the sum β3+β4 exceeds 4, suggesting that the deliberate nonuse of the
punishment option, relative to the Trust condition, has a positive effect. A joint
test of statistical signiﬁcance suggests that the null hypothesis β3 + β4 = 0 can
be rejected at the p<0.05 level for both the CEO and student sample. Taken
together, our results therefore suggest that there are indeed signiﬁcant hidden
returns of incentives: it is advantageous to have the ability of signaling that you
abstainfromusingthepunishmentoptioncomparedtonothavingthepunishment
option available.
Thus far our results reveal that not using the punishment option dominates,
in a material sense, both using the option and not having the option available.
This raises the question of whether principals took advantage of this effect by not
using the option. Our next result shows that this was not the case.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 18 — #18
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Result 4. The majority of CEO and student principals use the punishment
option in the TWP condition. However, CEOs use the punishment option less
often.
In total, 79.4% of the student principals (50 out of 63) chose the punishment
optionwhileonly60.5%oftheCEOprincipals(23ofthe38)chosethepunishment
option. This difference is signiﬁcant at the p<0.05 percent level (z =− 2.05)
according to a Fisher’s Exact test.
Why did the majority of student and CEO principals in the TWP condition
choosethepunishmentoptionalthoughthiscausedasubstantialreductionintheir
monetarypayoff?Onepossibilityisthattheprincipalshavesocialpreferencesthat
induce them to choose the punishment option. For example, if principals dislike
beingworseoffthanagents,theymaywanttocorrectthepayoffinequalitycreated
by a shirking agent by choosing the punishment option. Thus, if principals are
sufﬁciently inequality averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), and if they anticipate a sufﬁciently high probability that
theagentwillshirk, theywillusethepunishmentoption.19 Likewise, ifprincipals Footnote 19
exhibit reciprocal preferences they prefer to punish hostile actions. In our context
this means that reciprocal principals prefer to punish a shirking agent even if it is
costly for themselves.20 Footnote 20
Another reason for the frequent use of the punishment option could be that
the principals did not anticipate the negative effect on paybacks that is caused by
usingtheoption.Thereissomeevidence(Heath1999)indicatingthatpeoplehave
an extrinsic incentive bias—people tend to believe that others are more motivated
than themselves by extrinsic incentives. In our setting, an extrinsic incentive bias
might have led the principals to favor the punishment option. Our data do not
allow us to parse out the correct interpretation for the behavior of the principals.
It is, however, possible to rule out rational inequality aversion as a reason for
theprincipals’behavior. Notethatifinequality-averseprincipalsarerationalthey
willimposethepunishmentonlyiftheycanrationallyexpecttocorrectthepayoff
inequality between principals and agents. Yet, Table 3 shows that by using the
punishment option in the TWP condition, the payoff advantage of the agents
increases from 3.9 to 10.6 for the CEOs. Thus, rational inequality-averse CEO
principals have even more reason not to use the punishment option compared to
19. The Fehr-Schmidt model of inequality aversion assumes that a substantial fraction of individ-
uals care for their own material payoff and the absolute differences between their own payoff and
the payoff of relevant reference actors. In our setting the agent clearly is a relevant reference actor
for the principal. The Bolton–Ockenfels model assumes that a fraction of the subjects care about the
payoff ratio.
20. For models of reciprocity see, e.g., Rabin (1993); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999); or
Falk and Fischbacher (1999).“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 19 — #19
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money-maximizingCEOprincipals. Inthecaseofstudents, Table3indicatesthat
the use of the punishment option changes the payoff advantage of the agents, on
average,from6.7to6.3.AMann–Whitneytestindicatesthatthissmalldifference
is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Thus, rational inequality-averse student
principals also have no reason to use the punishment option because this reduces
their absolute payoff without changing the payoff differences. Therefore, only
the negative reciprocity hypothesis and the extrinsic incentive bias hypothesis
remain plausible candidates for explaining the principals’ behavior in the TWP
condition.
In view of the possibility that the majority of principals might be prone to an
extrinsic incentive bias, it is interesting to ask whether the use of the punishment
option in the TWP condition decreases the payback compared to the Trust con-
dition where the incentive was not available. In addition, it is interesting to know
whether principals who use the punishment option gain in material terms if they
are deprived of the punishment option. Our next result addresses this question.
Result 5. CEO agents pay back more money if the punishment option is not
available than when it is available and used. Student agents pay back the same
amount of money irrespective of whether the option is not available or available
and used. Neither CEO nor student principals who use the punishment option
gain in material terms if they are deprived of the option.
Support for Result 5 comes from Tables 2 and 3. Table 3 shows that CEO
agents pay back 32.7% of the tripled investment if they face a punishment threat
whileifthisthreatisnotavailabletheypayback44.1%.UsingaWilcoxonsigned-
ranks test, we ﬁnd that this difference is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels (p<0.05). Our regression model also conﬁrms this result. In Table 2, the
coefﬁcient for TWP measures the effect of being in the TWP condition and using
the punishment option relative to the Trust condition. The Tobit random effects
speciﬁcation for the CEOs suggests that the estimated coefﬁcient is negative and
signiﬁcantly different from zero at the p<0.10 level; a coefﬁcient estimate
of 1.5 implies that CEO agents pay back roughly 1.5 units less in the TWP if
they face a punishment threat. To examine whether this led to a higher payoff for
the CEO principals, we applied a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to the principals’
payoffs in row 4 of Table 3 and found that the null hypothesis of equal payoffs
cannot be rejected at conventional levels (z = 1.16).
Table 3 indicates that student agents even decrease the payback from 34.9%
of the tripled investment, if they face a punishment threat, to 31.6% percent
of the tripled investment, if no threat is available. However, both a Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test and the Tobit random effects regression model in Table 2 show
that this payback change is not statistically signiﬁcant, and that the size of
the TWP-coefﬁcient is small. Likewise the null hypothesis of equal principal“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 20 — #20
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payoffs cannot be rejected according to a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. Thus,
neither the CEO nor the student principals who use the punishment option
would gain in material terms if they were deprived of the possibility to use the
option.
One of the outstanding features of our data is that both student and CEO
agents pay back more money if the principals deliberately do not use the punish-
ment threat (see Figures 3 and 4). In our view the notion of reciprocity provides
a natural interpretation of these data. Recall that reciprocity means that agents
respond in a hostile manner to actions that reveal a hostile intention. In our treat-
ments, the threat to punish agents may reveal hostile intentions for two reasons.
First, the threat per se may be perceived as hostile. Second, agents may perceive
the threat as an indication of distrust. To the extent to which trusting actions
are perceived as kind and distrusting actions as hostile, an explicit punishment
threat may be perceived as a hostile act. Whatever the reason for interpreting
someone’s intention as hostile may be, if reciprocal agents perceive the explicit
threat as a hostile act they are less willing to pay back money beyond the level
that is dictated by pure self-interest. In this context we ﬁnd one fact particularly
interesting. Note that, irrespective of whether the punishment threat was used,
CEO principals desired to receive a back-transfer ˆ y that, if ˆ y was met, equal-
ized payoffs of the principal and the agent (see boldfaced ﬁgures in Line 2 of
Table 3). Thus, the actions of the CEO principals implied a desire for a fair
payoff distribution both when they used and when they did not use the punish-
ment option in the TWP. Nevertheless, when the punishment option was used,
the agents paid back only half as much (as a percentage of tripled investment).
In our view this lends support to our interpretation in terms of the perceived
hostility of the punishment threat because the different payback levels of the
agents cannot be attributed to differences in the fairness of the intended payoff
distribution.
The previous argument interprets the difference in agent behavior within
the TWP condition in terms of reciprocity. Further evidence for the reciprocity
interpretation is provided by the difference in agents’ behavior between the TWP
condition,whenpunishmentisnotused,andtheTrustcondition.Inbothsituations
principals do not use the punishment option. The only difference is that in the
Trust condition they cannot use it, while in the TWP condition they voluntarily
do not use it. In our view it is quite plausible that the deliberate nonuse of the
punishment option is perceived as a particularly kind and trusting move. As a
consequence, reciprocal agents have a particular reason to reward this move.
Of course, it would be reassuring for our interpretation if the agents did not
only perceive the nonuse of the punishment threat as a particularly trusting act
but if the principals in the TWP did in fact exhibit more trust when they refrained
from using the threat. To examine this question we examine transfer levels in the
TWP treatment and ﬁnd the following.“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 21 — #21
Fehr and List Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs 21
Result 6. Principals who do not punish in the TWP condition transfer more
money to the agents than both principals who punish, and principals who are
deprived of the punishment option.
Table 3 shows that CEO principals in the TWP condition invested 6.5 units
if they threatened to punish, while if they did not use the threat they invested
8.5 units. This difference is signiﬁcant at the p<0.05 level according to a
Mann–Whitney test. The table also shows that student principals increased their
investmentfrom4.4unitswhentheyusedthepunishmentthreatto7.4unitswhen
theydidnot,whichisagainsigniﬁcantatconventionallevels(Mann–Whitneytest:
p<0.05). This indeed suggests that those principals who voluntarily refrained
from the punishment threat exhibited more trust. Thus, in view of this ﬁnding, it
also seems quite rational for the agents to interpret the absence of the punishment
threat in the TWP condition as a particularly trusting act. It is also interesting
that those principals who do not punish in the TWP condition also invest much
more than the principals in the Trust condition. This effect is again signiﬁcant for
CEOs as well as for students (p<0.05 for CEOs and for students according to a
Wilcoxonsigned-rankstestformatchedpairs). Thissuggeststhattheseprincipals
actually exhibit more trust if they can signal their good intentions.
Finally, weconsiderefﬁciencyconsequencesoftheavailabilityandtheuseof
thepunishmentoption.Efﬁciencyisdeterminedjointlybytheactionsofprincipals
and agents. Principals’ transfers determine the total pie that is available for the
two parties in the Trust condition and the TWP condition if the punishment is
not chosen. If, in the TWP condition, the punishment option has been chosen,
paybacks of the agents determine whether the total available pie is reduced by
actual punishments.
Result 7. CEOs consistently achieve higher efﬁciency levels. Across condi-
tions, efﬁciency is highest when the punishment option is available and not used
and lowest if the punishment option is used. Intermediate efﬁciency levels prevail
if the punishment threat is not available.
We measure efﬁciency as a percentage of the maximum surplus that could
have been generated by the two parties. In all treatment conditions the maximum
surplus is 40 shanks ($80 for CEOs, $8 for students). In the Trust condition
and the TWP condition without a punishment threat, this level is achieved if the
principal transfers his entire endowment to the agent. If, in the TWP condition,
the principal uses the punishment threat, an additional requirement for achieving
the maximum surplus is that the agent pays back the desired amount of money.
Support for Result 7 is provided in Table 4, which shows the efﬁciency levels Table 4
that are reached by CEOs and students in the various conditions. The table shows
that across all conditions the CEOs achieve between 5 and 12 percentage points“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 22 — #22
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Table 4. Efﬁciency
Average efﬁciency
Trust game 70.0% (12.9)
79.7% (11.4)
Trust with punishment 70.9% (15.9)
82.9% (13.4)
Trust, no punishment used 87.3% (8.3)
92.3% (10.7)
Trust, punishment used 66.7% (14.7)
76.6% (11.5)
Notes: Efﬁciency = (principal’s payoff + agent’s payoff)/40. CEO data in
bold. Standard deviations in parentheses.
higher efﬁciency levels than the students. The table also shows that—irrespective
of whether we examine the CEO data or the student data—efﬁciency is highest
in the TWP condition without punishment and lowest in the TWP condition with
punishment. Thus, consonant with the results highlighted previously, viewed
from the efﬁciency perspective it is good to have the incentive available but to
refrain from using it.
4. Concluding Remarks
WeexaminedhowCEOsprovideandrespondtoincentivesinsituationsrequiring
trust and trustworthiness. Our data show that CEOs exhibit considerably more
trustful and trustworthy behavior than students. As a consequence, CEOs reach
substantially higher efﬁciency levels. These results indicate that nonpecuniary
motives may play a more important role in transactions among CEOs than in
transactions among students. The fact that CEOs use the punishment option less
oftensuggeststhatCEOsbetterrecognizethevitalrolethattrustplaysineliciting
trustworthy behavior.
Behavior of both CEOs and students indicates that there are hidden costs
and returns of explicit punishment threats. This result suggests that if we focus
our attention exclusively on the self-interest motive when assessing the effects
of incentives such effects will escape our attention. Both CEOs and students
respond in a less trustworthy manner if they face an explicit punishment threat in
case of shirking. However, while the use of the punishment threat causes hidden
costs, theavailabilityofthepunishmentthreatcauseshiddenreturns: ifprincipals
voluntarily refrain from the threat to punish, then they induce more trustworthy
behavior than in a situation in which no punishment threat is available. This
indicates that trustworthiness is affected by not only the absence or presence of
thepunishmentthreatbutalsobythereasonfortheabsenceofthethreat. Itseems
that voluntarily refraining from the threat to punish is perceived as a particularly“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 23 — #23
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trusting act, which is reciprocated with a particularly trustworthy act. Thus, in
our context trust breeds trustworthiness.
Taken together it turns out that trustworthiness and efﬁciency is highest if the
explicitpunishmentthreatisavailablebutnotused,whileitislowestiftheexplicit
threat is used. Despite this ﬁnding, it is not wise to make the punishment threat
unavailable because the availability of the threat enables principals to signal trust
by deliberately not using the threat. However, the vast majority of students and a
majority of CEOs forego this opportunity of signaling trust, causing a substantial
reductionintheirmaterialpayoff. Itisaninterestingandimportanttaskforfuture
research to examine the precise reasons behind this paradox.
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Appendix A. Instructions for Trust-condition
You are actor 1
Description of your decision problem
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem. You have been
randomly matched with another participant in this problem who is in another
room. You will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or
after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be informed
about your identity. You are in the role of actor 1 and the matched participant is
in the role of actor 2. You as well as actor 2 participate only once in this decision
problem. You make your decisions with the help of the decision sheet that has
been handed out together with this description. Here are the rules that you and
actor 2 have to obey when you make your decisions:
Endowment
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks.
Your decision
You have to make a decision that consists of two components:
➊ A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2.
You can transfer any amount between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2. You make
this decision by indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box
on your decision sheet. We will then triple this transferred amount, i.e., actor
2 receives three times the amount of shanks you transferred.
➋ A desired back-transfer from actor 2.
After you have made your transfer to actor 2 you indicate a desired back-
transfer on your decision sheet. The desired back-transfer is the amount you
would like to receive back from actor 2. The desired back-transfer can be any
number between 0 and three times the amount you have transferred.
The decision of actor 2
Once you have ﬁxed both components of your decision, we collect your decision
sheet and give it to actor 2. In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions.
Then actor 2 can transfer any amount of the total number of shanks he received
back to you.
Payoffs
You as actor 1 receive: 10 shanks − transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from
actor 2.
Actor 2 receives: 10 shanks+3×transfer from actor 1−back-transfer
to actor 1.
Exchange rate: For every shank you earn you will be paid $2 (2 U.S. dollars).“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 25 — #25
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Appendix B: Instructions for Trust with Punishment Condition
You are actor 1
Description of a New Decision Problem
You will now participate in a new decision problem. As before you are randomly matched
with another participant in another room. You are again in the role of actor 1. The other
participant is in the role of actor 2. Notice that in this new decision problem you are
matched with a new person, i.e., actor 2 is now a different person compared to the
previous problem. Once again, you will never be informed of the identity of this person,
either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be
informed about your identity.
The new decision problem is—with one exemption—identical to the previous problem.
The exemption concerns the conditional payoff cut. In the new problem you can impose
a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on actor 2. In every other respect the problem is the
same. Thus both actors receive again an initial endowment of 10 shanks.
Your decision
Again you have to indicate on your decision sheet what amount you want to transfer to
actor 2 and what your desired back-transfer is. Actor 2 receives three times the amount of
shanks you transferred.
In addition to the transfer and the desired back-transfer you also have to indicate on your
decision sheet if you want to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on actor 2.
• A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks for actor 2 has the following consequences: The
payoff of actor 2 will be reduced by 4 shanks if his actual back-transfer is less than
your desired back-transfer. The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not
reduce the income of actor 2, if actor 2 transfers exactly your desired amount or more
to you.
• If you do not impose a conditional payoff cut—the income of actor 2 will not be
reduced, irrespective of how large the back-transfer of actor 2 is.
The decision of actor 2
Onceyouhaveﬁxedallthreecomponentsofyourdecision, wecollectyourdecisionsheet
and give it to actor 2. In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions. Then actor 2
can transfer any amount of the total number of shanks he received back to you. In case
that you have chosen a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks, and if actor 2 transfers back
less than what you desired, the conditional cut is due.
Payoffs
You as actor 1 receive: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2.
Actor 2 receives: 10 shanks + 3 × transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor
1 – 4 shanks (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been
imposed and is due)
Exchange rate: For every shank you earn you will be paid $2 (2 U.S. dollars).“zwu0169” — 2004/6/14 — page 26 — #26
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Appendix C: Instructions for Trust Condition
You are actor 2
Description of your decision problem
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem. You have been
randomly matched with another participant in this problem who is in another
room. You will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or
after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be informed
about your identity. You are in the role of actor 2 and the matched participant is
in the role of actor 1. You as well as actor 1 participate only once in this decision
problem. You make your decisions with the help of a decision sheet that will be
given to you after actor 1 has indicated his decision on this sheet. Here are the
rules that you and actor 1 have to obey when you make your decisions:
Endowment
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks.
The decision of actor 1
Firstactor1hastomakeadecisionthatconsistsofthefollowingtwocomponents:
➊ A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to you.
Actor1cantransferanyamountbetween0and10shankstoyou.Actor1makes
this decision by indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box
onthedecisionsheet. Wewillthentriplethistransferredamount, i.e., youwill
receive three times the amount of shanks transferred by actor 1.
➋ A desired back-transfer from you.
After actor 1 made a transfer to you he indicated a desired back-transfer on
the decision sheet. The desired back-transfer is the amount he would like to
receive back from you. The desired back-transfer can be any number between
0 and three times the amount that actor 1 has transferred to you.
Your decision
Once actor 1 has ﬁxed both components of the decision, we collect the decision
sheet and give it to you. In this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions.
Then you can transfer any amount of the total number of shanks you received
back to actor 1.
Payoffs
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Appendix D: Instructions for Trust with punishment condition
You are actor 2
Description of a New Decision Problem
You will now participate in a new decision problem. As before you are randomly matched
with another participant in another room. You are again in the role of actor 2. The other
participant is in the role of actor 1. Notice that in this new decision problem you are
matched with a new person, i.e., actor 1 is now a different person compared to the
previous problem. Once again, you will never be informed of the identity of this person,
either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be
informed about your identity.
The new decision problem is—with one exemption—identical to the previous problem.
The exemption concerns the conditional payoff cut. In the new problem actor 1 can
impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on you. In every other respect the problem
is the same. Thus both actors receive again an initial endowment of 10 shanks.
The decision of actor 1
Again actor 1 has to indicate on the decision sheet what amount he wants to transfer to
you and what his desired back-transfer is. You receive three times the amount of shanks
actor 1 transferred to you.
In addition to the transfer and the desired back-transfer actor 1 also has to indicate on the
decision sheet if he wants to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on you.
• A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks has the following consequences for you: Your
payoff will be reduced by 4 shanks if your actual back-transfer is less than the back-
transfer desired by actor 1. The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not
reduce your income, if you transfer exactly the desired amount or more to actor 1.
• In case that actor 1 does not impose a conditional payoff cut—your income will not
be reduced, irrespective of how large your back-transfer to actor 1 is.
Your decision
Once actor 1 has ﬁxed all three components of the decision, we collect the decision sheet
and give it to you. In this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions. Then you can
transfer any amount of the total number of shanks you received back to actor 1. In case
that actor 1 imposed a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks, and if you transfer back less
than actor 1’s desired amount, the conditional cut is due.
Payoffs
Actor 1 receives: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2.
You as Actor 2 receive: 10 shanks + 3 × transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor
1 – 4 shanks (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been
imposed and is due)
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EDITORIAL QUERY
ED1: Ed: Ok to let this page run short in order to keep Appendices A, B, C and
D as 1-page set-ups? Please advise.